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R E T H I N K I N G S E L F - I N C R I M I N A T I O N , V O L U N T A R I N E S S , 
A N D C O E R C I O N , T H R O U G H A P E R S P E C T I V E OF J E W I S H 
L A W A N D L E G A L T H E O R Y 
SAMUEL J. LEVINE 
Introduction 
This Essay briefly explores the relevance of Jewish law and 
legal theory in an analysis of the American law of criminal 
confessions.1 Specifically, through an examination of the substance 
and possible rationale of the rule against self-incrimination in Jewish 
law, the Essay considers the concepts of voluntariness and coercion in 
Professor of Law & Director, Jewish Law Institute, Touro Law Center. 
An earlier version of this Essay was presented as a public lecture at Wayne 
State University Law School on October 26, 2010, at the invitation of Ruby 
Robinson, Paul Dubinsky, and the Jewish Law Students Association. I thank Ruby 
and Paul for organizing my visit, and I thank Steve Winter and the faculty, 
administration, and students at Wayne State for their hospitality and helpful 
conversations. I also thank Judge Gerald Rosen, Chief Judge of United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan and Adjunct Professor of Law at 
Wayne State, for introducing me to his class and attending the lecture. Finally, I 
thank Jason Eggert and Heather Amico for inviting me to publish this Essay in the 
Journal of Law in Society. 
11 have explored some of these issues in previous articles. See, e.g., Samuel J. 
Levine, An Introduction to Self-incrimination in Jewish Law, With Application to the 
American Legal System: A Psychological and Philosophical Analysis, 28 LOY. L.A. 
INTL. & COMP. L. REV. 257 (2006) [hereinafter, Levine, An Introduction to Self-
incrimination in Jewish Law]; Samuel J. Levine, Applying Jewish Legal Theory in 
the Context of American Law and Legal Scholarship: A Methodological Analysis, 40 
SETON HALL L. REV. 933 (2010) [hereinafter Levine, Applying Jewish Legal 
Theory]; Samuel J. Levine, Miranda, Dickerson, and Jewish Legal Theory: The 
Constitutional Rule in a Comparative Analytical Framework, 69 MD. L. REV. 78 
(2009). 
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the context of the American constitutional right against compelled 
self-incrimination.2 
Part I of the Essay provides a survey of primary and secondary 
sources in Jewish law that delineate the categorical ban on criminal 
confessions in the Jewish legal system. This section focuses on the 
work of legal philosophers who explained the rule based on 
2
 For references to the Jewish law of self-incrimination in American legal 
scholarship, see, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical 
Perspective: The Right to Remain Silent, in The PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 181,279 n.28 (1997); Cheryl G. 
Bader, "Forgive me Victim for I Have Sinned": Why Repentance and the Criminal 
Justice System Do Not Mix—A Lesson From Jewish Law, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 69, 
88 (2003); Isaac Braz, The Privilege Against Self-incrimination in Anglo-American 
Law: The Influence of Jewish Law, in JEWISH LAW AND CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 
168 (Nahum Rakover ed., 1984); PETER BROOKS, TROUBLING CONFESSIONS: 
SPEAKING GUILT IN LAW & LITERATURE 72 (Univ. of Chicago Press 2000); Debra 
Ciardiello, Seeking Refuge in the Fifth Amendment: The Applicability of the 
Privilege Against Self-incrimination to Individuals Who Risk Incrimination Outside 
the United States, 15 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 722, 725 (1992); Suzanne Darrow-
Kleinhaus, The Talmudic Rule Against Self-incrimination and the American 
Exclusionary Rule: A Societal Prohibition Versus an Affirmative Individual Right, 
21 N.Y. L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 205 (2002); Malvina Halberstam, The Rationale 
for Excluding Incriminating Statements: U.S. Law Compared to Ancient Jewish Law, 
in JEWISH LAW AND CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra, at 177; George Horowitz, 
The Privilege Against Self-incrimination— How Did It Originate?, 31 TEMPLE L.Q. 
121, 125 (1958) ; LEONARD W . LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE 
RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 433-441 (1968); Simcha Mandelbaum, The 
Privilege Against Self-incrimination in Anglo-American and Jewish Law, 5 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 115, 116-118 (1956); Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, In the 
Beginning: The Talmudic Rule Against Self-incrimination, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 955 
(1988); Bernard Susser, Worthless Confessions: The Torah Approach, 130 NEW L.J. 
1056 (1980); Daniel J. Seidmann & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the 
Innocent: A Game Theoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114 HARV. 
L. REV. 431, 452 n.70 (2000); Michelle M. Sharoni, A Journey of Two Countries: A 
Comparative Study of the Death Penalty in Israel and South Africa, 24 HASTINGS 
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 257, 263 (2001); Erica Smith-Klocek, Note, A Halachic 
Perspective on the Parent-Child Privilege, 39 CATH. LAW. 105, 109 (1999); Gregory 
Thomas Stremers, The Self-incrimination Clause and the Threat of Foreign 
Prosecution in Bankruptcy Proceedings: A Comment on Moses v. Allard, 70 U. DET. 
MERCY L. REV. 847, 854-55 (1993); Aaron M. Schreiber, The Jurisprudence of 
Dealing with Unsatisfactory Fundamental Law: A Comparative Glance at the 
Different Approaches in Medieval Criminal Law, Jewish Law and the United States 
Supreme Court, 11 PACE L. REV. 535, 550 (1991). 
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psychological insights identifying forms of internal compulsion that 
may lead to false admissions of guilt. Building on this survey, Part II 
looks at two United States Supreme Court-cases, Miranda v. Arizona* 
and Garrity v. New Jersey? that referenced Jewish law in addressing 
issues of voluntariness in the American law of self-incrimination.5 
Comparing and contrasting the methodologies used in the two 
majority opinions, this part develops a conceptual framework for the 
application of Jewish law and legal theory to Amer ican law. Through 
this framework, part II finds that the methodology in Garrity 
effectively relies on psychological insights from Jewish legal theory to 
add depth to the Court ' s understanding and interpretation of American 
law. 
Part III takes the analysis one step further, suggesting that the 
methodology in Garrity offered a potential model for courts to further 
develop the doctrine of voluntariness in criminal confessions. This 
model would have allowed courts to expand the contours of coercion, 
taking into account a broader understanding of the effect of internal 
psychological coercion on the voluntariness of confessions. Instead, 
this part argues, the Supreme Court missed the opportunity to develop 
such a doctrine, when presented with the 1986 case, Colorado v. 
Connelly.6 Finally, the Essay concludes that, in light of recent studies 
documenting the troubling prevalence of false confessions that are not 
the result of physical coercion, Amer ican courts should rethink the 
issue of voluntariness in the context of self-incrimination, to adopt a 
3
 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
4
 385 U.S. 493 (1967). 
5
 For other cases citing Jewish law in the context of discussions of self-
incrimination, see, e.g., In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1300 (D. Nev. 1983); 
Moses v. Allard, 779 F. Supp. 857, 870 (E.D. Mich. 1991); People v. Brown, 86 
Misc. 2d 339, 487 n.5 (Nassau County Ct. 1975); Roberts v. Madigan, 702 F. Supp. 
1505, 1517 n.20 (D. Colo. 1989); State v. McCloskey, 446 A.2d. 1201, 1208 n.4 
(N.J. 1982); U.S. v. Gecas, 120 F.3d 1419, 1425 (11th Cir. 1997); U.S. v. Huss, 482 
F.2d. 38, 51(2dCir. 1973). 
6
 479 U.S. 157(1986). 
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more expansive understanding of ways in which both external and 
internal forms of psychological coercion impact criminal confessions. 
I. Self-incrimination in Jewish Law: A Brief Survey7 
In tracing the development of a doctrine in the Jewish legal 
system, it is usually helpful to begin with the oldest, most basic, and 
most authoritative source of law—the written Torah.8 However , while 
the Torah enumerates laws that relate to criminal and civil procedure, 
including various laws of testimonial evidence,9 the text of the Torah 
does not expressly address the issue of self-incrimination. 
Instead, the first sources of Jewish law that discuss the rules of 
confessions are found in the Talmud, the authoritative collection of 
centuries of post-Biblical legal deliberations, enactments, and 
rulings.10 The Talmud draws a distinction between a criminal 
confession and a monetary concession: in the case of a commercial 
dispute, a concession to an obligation is admissible as demonstrable 
7
 This section borrows, in part, from Levine, An Introduction to Self-incrimination in 
Jewish Law, supra note 1. For more extensive substantive discussions of the rule in 
Jewish law, see, e.g., AARON KlRSCHENBAUM, SELF-INCRIMINATION IN JEWISH LAW 
(Burning Bush Press 1970); Arnold Enker, Self-incrimination in Jewish Law—A 
Review Essay, 4 DINE ISRAEL cvii (1973) (reviewing KlRSCHENBAUM, supra). 
For discussions of the sources of Jewish law, and the central function of the written 
Torah, see, e.g., Irving A. Breitowitz, Sources of Jewish Law, in BETWEEN CIVIL 
AND RELIGIOUS LAW: THE PLIGHT OF THE AGUNAH IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 307-13 
(1993); Menachem Elon, The Basic Norm and the Sources of Jewish Law, in JEWISH 
LAW: HISTORY, SOURCES, PRINCIPLES 228-39 (Bernard Auerbach & Melvin J. Sykes 
trans., 1994); Aaron Kirschenbaum, A Historical Sketch of the Sources of Jewish 
Law, in EQUITY IN JEWISH LAW: HALAKHIC PERSPECTIVES IN LAW: FORMALISM AND 
FLEXIBILITY IN JEWISH CIVIL LAW 289-304 (1991); Samuel J. Levine, An 
Introduction to Legislation in Jewish Law, With References to the American Legal 
System, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 916 (1999); Samuel J. Levine, Jewish Legal Theory 
and American Constitutional Theory: Some Comparisons and Contrasts, 24 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 441 (1997). 
s 
9
 See, e.g., Deuteronomy 17:6; 19:15-19. 
10
 For a helpful introduction to the Talmud; see ADIN STEINSALTZ, THE ESSENTIAL 
TALMUD (Chaya Galai trans., 1976). 
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evidence of the par ty ' s civil liability. Indeed, while the burden of 
proof in Jewish law typically calls for the credible test imony of two 
witnesses, and as a procedural matter parties did not offer testimony, 
the Talmud declares that the probative value of a civil admission is the 
equivalent of "one hundred witnesses."1 ' This rule is not particularly 
surprising when viewed through the pr ism of a similar dynamic in 
American law: in a civil dispute, if one of the parties offers a reliable 
concession to the other s ide 's claim, the dispute will presumably be 
resolved in accordance with the concession, with little if any need for 
further evidence or deliberation. 
However, Jewish law prescribes a diametrically opposing rule 
for criminal confessions. The Talmud states categorically that a 
criminal defendant 's confession is not admissible as evidence against 
the defendant. In this regard, Jewish law differs starkly from the 
American legal system, in which a lawfully obtained criminal 
confession is among the most effective pieces of evidence a prosecutor 
can offer against a criminal defendant. In fact, as a practical matter, if 
an American jury finds a confession reliable, it might be said—to 
paraphrase the Ta lmud ' s characterization of a civil admission in 
Jewish law—that in an American court, a criminal defendant 's 
confession is as probative as the test imony of 100 witnesses.1 3 
11
 See, e.g., TALMUD BAVLI, Bava Metzia 3b. 
12
 See, e.g., TALMUD BAVLI, Sanhedrin 9b. See also HERSHEL SCHACHTER, ERETZ 
HATZEVI 237-249 (1992). 
13
 As Justice Brennan put it: 
Our distrust for reliance on confessions is due, in part, to their 
decisive impact upon the adversarial process. Triers of fact accord 
confessions such heavy weight in their determinations that "the 
introduction of a confession makes the other aspects of a trial in 
court superfluous, and the real trial, for all practical purposes, 
occurs when the confession is obtained." . . . No other class of 
evidence is so profoundly prejudicial... . "Thus the decision to 
confess before trial amounts in effect to a waiver of the right to 
require the state at trial to meet its heavy burden of proof." 
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 182 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations 
omitted). 
Indeed, scholars have described 
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The Talmud provides a brief explanation for the outright ban 
on criminal confessions, premised on the principle that, under Jewish 
law, relatives to the parties in a case are disqualified from offering 
testimony.1 4 As an extension of that principle, the Talmud posits that 
because a person is one ' s own (closest) relative, a criminal defendant 
is l ikewise disqualified from testifying.15 The Talmud then concludes 
with a statement that roughly translates to "a person may not 
incriminate one ' s self."16 
While the Talmudic rule against the admissibility of criminal 
confessions is both clear on its face and categorical, the basis for the 
rule is less apparent. Notwithstanding the Ta lmud ' s technical 
derivation of the rule, founded upon principles of witness 
disqualification, later Jewish legal authorities delved further into the 
matter, in an attempt to uncover underlying sources and rationales 
behind the Ta lmud ' s outright ban on criminal confession. 
One of the most important of these discussions is the analysis 
provided by the medieval Jewish legal authority and philosopher 
Moses Maimonides. 7 In the Mishne Torah, his landmark restatement 
of Jewish law, Maimonides declares unequivocally that the ban on 
a growing body of research demonstrating the power of confession 
evidence to substantially prejudice a trier of fact's ability to even-
handedly evaluate a criminal defendant's culpability. As both 
experimental and field studies have demonstrated, criminal 
officials and jurors often place almost blind faith in the evidentiary 
value of confession evidence—even when, as in all the cases in this 
study, the confession was not accompanied by any credible 
corroboration and there was compelling evidence of the 
defendant's factual innocence. 
Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-
DNA World, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 891, 996 (2004). 
14
 See TALMUD BAVLI, Sanhedrin 9b. 
15
 See id. 
uId. 
17
 For a discussion of Maimonides and the Mishneh Torah, see ISADORE TWERSKY, 
INTRODUCTION TO THE CODE OF MAIMONIDES (MISHNEH TORAH) (22 Yale Judaica 
Series, Leon Nemoy et al. eds., 1980). 
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criminal confessions is grounded in a "scriptural decree."1 8 
Nevertheless, Maimonides offers a possible rationale for the rule, 
raising the concern that a criminal defendant might confess because of 
having "confused mind" in the matter.1 9 As Maimonides further 
explains, a defendant may suffer from an extreme form of depression 
that leads to suicidal tendencies, expressed through a false confession 
to a capital crime. 
Centuries later, in a commentary on the Mishne Torah, Rabbi 
David ben Zimra [Radbaz] focused on the distinction between 
criminal confessions and monetary admissions.2 1 Radbaz noted that 
Jewish law recognizes individuals ' authority over their own 
possessions, including the autonomy to give their property to others. 
Accordingly, he reasoned, a civil defendant has the autonomy to admit 
to and incur a monetary obligation. In contrast, because the human 
body is considered sacred, it remains outside the province of the 
individual 's autonomy. Hence, Jewish law includes prohibitions on 
suicide or damaging one ' s own body, likewise precluding a criminal 
confession that would bring about capital or corporal punishment.2 2 
Rabbi Norman L a m m offered a modern gloss on these principles 
in a 1956 article comparing the psychological insights provided by 
Maimonides and Radbaz to those propounded by Freud and 
Menninger in the twentieth century.23 As Rabbi Lamm put it, 
Maimonides "anticipated by some seven hundred years, albeit in 
rudimentary fashion, a major achievement of psychoanalysis [,]" 
18
 MAIMONIDES, MISHNE TORAH, Laws of Sanhedrin 18:6. See also MAIMONIDES, 
MISHNE TORAH, Laws of Eduth 12:2. 
19
 MAIMONIDES, MISHNE TORAH, Laws of Sanhedrin 18:6. 
20
 Id. 
21
 See supra text accompanying notes 11-12. 
22
 See RADBAZ, Commentary, in MAIMONIDES, MISHNE TORAH, Laws of Sanhedrin 
18:6. 
23
 Norman Lamm, The Fifth Amendment and Its Equivalent in the Halakhah, 5 
Judaism 53, 56 (1956). 
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Freud's theory of the "Death Wish" or "Death Instinct,"24 while 
Radbaz seems to evoke Menninger ' s observation that psychological 
forces at t imes result in "a variety of forms of partial or chronic self-
destruction," including "self-injury and self-mutilation." Whichever 
theory is applied, Rabbi L a m m emphasizes that: "[w]hile certainly not 
all, or even most criminal confessions are directly attributable, in 
whole or in part, to the Death Instinct, the Hala[c]ha is sufficiently 
concerned with the minority of instances, where such is the case, to 
disqualify all criminal confessions and to discard confession as a legal 
instrument." 
II. Applying Jewish Law to the Amer ican Law of Criminal 
Confessions: A Conceptual Framework 
Building on the explanations for the rule against criminal 
confessions in Jewish law, this Essay now considers possible 
applications of the rule in American law, by drawing a contrast 
between two United States Supreme Court cases: Miranda v. 
77 7R 
Arizona and Garrity v. New Jersey. Notably, although the majority 
opinions in both of these cases cited Rabbi L a m m ' s article, the 
opinions implement and illustrate different methodological approaches 
to applying Jewish legal theory to issues in American law.2 9 
24
 Id. at 56. 
25
 Id. at 57. 
26
 Id. at 59. For other discussions of the views of Maimonides and Radbaz in 
contemporary scholarship, see, e.g., KlRSCHENBAUM, supra note 7, at 62-68, 72-77; 
Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 1032-41; HERSHEL SCHACHTER, MLPNINEI 
HARAV 225 (2001). 
27
 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
28
 385 U.S. 493 (1967). 
29
 For a more complete elaboration of this section, see Levine, Applying Jewish 
Legal Theory, supra note 1. 
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In Miranda, Chief Justice Earl Warren included a reference to 
Jewish law at the start of section II of his landmark majority option. 
In support of the assertion that the "roots" of the privilege against self-
incrimination "go back into ancient t imes[,]" the opinion states, in a 
footnote, that " [ th i r t een th century commentators found an analogue to 
the privilege grounded in the Bible."3 1 Specifically, the footnote 
quotes Maimonides ' conclusion that: "[t]o sum up the matter, the 
principle that no man is to be declared guilty on his own admission is a 
divine decree." The footnote then concludes with a citation to Rabbi 
L a m m ' s 1956 article.33 
Although the footnote relies on important sources of Jewish 
law, there remain questions as to the relevance of these sources in the 
context of the Cour t ' s opinion. In Miranda, the Court detailed the 
prevalence of police interrogation techniques that violated the 
Constitution. The Court found that these techniques included both 
blatant and more subtle forms of psychological coercion, rendering the 
suspects ' responses insufficiently voluntary, in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment . 3 4 
Significantly, however, the Court responded to this problem by 
instituting Miranda warnings, a remedy designed to insure the 
voluntariness of criminal confessions. Under this rule, once the 
suspect 's statement has been established as voluntary, the confession 
remains admissible as evidence and, by all accounts, constitutes one of 
the most powerful pieces of evidence available to a prosecutor.3 6 In 
30
 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458. 
31
 Id. at458n.27. 
32
 Id. (quoting Laws Concerning the Sanhedrin and the Penalties Within Their 
Jurisdiction, in The Code of Maimonides (Mishneh Torah): Book Fourteen: The 
Book of Judges treatise 1, ch. 18, P 6, at 53 (3 Yale Judaica Series, Julian Obermann 
et al. eds., Abraham M. Hershman trans., 1977) (1949)). 
33
 Id. (citing Lamm, supra note 23). 
34
 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448-458. 
33
 Id. at 467-79. 
See supra note 13. 
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light of the stark contrast to the rule in Jewish law, which, as a 
religious matter, bans criminal confessions entirely the Court ' s 
references to Maimonides and Rabbi Lamm seem somewhat 
anomalous. 
To be sure, the Court should not .simply and simplistically 
transplant a rule from another system into American law. Nor should 
the Court limit its comparative jurisprudence to legal systems that are 
nearly identical, in theory, or in substance, to American law. Indeed, 
comparative law studies often benefit from a careful analysis of both 
the differences and similarities between legal systems. 
Nevertheless, the Cour t ' s methodology in Miranda seems to 
undermine the value of any reliance on the reasoning of Maimonides 
and Rabbi Lamm. Rather than emphasizing these scholars ' 
philosophical and psychological insights, the Court cited Maimonides ' 
theological depiction of the categorical ban on criminal confessions as 
based in a "divine decree."3 7 The Cour t ' s methodology leaves open 
questions regarding the relevance of this principle to the Cour t ' s 
conclusion that, in the American legal system, voluntary criminal 
confessions are admissible . 
In Garrity v. New Jersey,38 a case decided less than a year 
later, the Court employed a different methodological approach. Like 
Miranda, Garrity revolved around a question of whether an 
interrogation technique violated the constitutional right against self-
-in 
incrimination. This time, the suspects were police officers who were 
37
 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458 n.27 (quoting Laws Concerning the Sanhedrin and the 
Penalties Within Their Jurisdiction, in The Code of Maimonides (Mishneh Torah): 
Book Fourteen: The Book of Judges treatise 1, ch. 18, P 6, at 53 (3 Yale Judaica 
Series, Julian Obermann et al. eds., Abraham M. Hershman trans., 1977) (1949)). 
38
 385 U.S. 493 (1967). 
39
 Although Garrity was decided under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Court's voluntariness analysis resembled and relied on the Fifth 
Amendment analysis in Miranda. For a critical analysis of the Court's increasing 
application of the Due Process Clause in place of the Self-incrimination Clause to 
decide the issue of the voluntariness of confessions, see Mark A. Godsey, Rethinking 
the Involuntary Confession Rule: Toward a Workable Test for Identifying Compelled 
Self-incrimination, 93 CAL. L. REV. 465 (2005). See also Lawrence Herman, The 
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told that they had the right to refuse to answer, but that such refusal 
would subject them to dismissal from their positions.4 0 The Court 
found this line of questions impermissibly coercive, rendering 
inadmissible any confessions. In his majority opinion, Justice Wil l iam 
Douglas emphasized that "[cjoercion that vitiates a confession . . . can 
be 'mental as well as physical" ' 4 1 and "[s]ubtle pressures m a y be as 
telling as coarse and vulgar ones."4 2 Applied to the facts of the case, 
the Court concluded: " W e think the statements were infected by the 
coercion inherent in this scheme of questions and cannot be sustained 
as voluntary under our prior decisions."4 3 
Once again, as in Miranda, the opinion in Garrity includes a 
footnote referencing Jewish law on self-incrimination.44 However , in 
sharp contrast to the brief and somewhat inapposite depiction of 
Jewish law in Miranda, the footnote in Garrity consists of an 
extensive quotation from Rabbi L a m m ' s article, providing a more 
complete, more relevant, and more effective application of Jewish 
legal theory. 
Unexplored Relationship Between the Privilege Against Compulsory Self-
incrimination and the Involuntary Confession Rule (Part II), 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 497 
(1992); Michael J. Mannheimer, Coerced Confessions and the Fourth Amendment, 
30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 57 (2002). 
40
 Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493,494 (1967). 
41
 Id. (quoting Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (I960)). 
42
 Id. at 496 (citing Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Leyra v. Denno, 
347 U.S. 566 (1954)). 
43
 Id. at 497-98. For a critique of the Court's analysis in Garrity, see Steven D. 
Clymer, Compelled Statements From Police Officers and Garrity Immunity, 76 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309 (2001). For an argument that "[t]he promises of Garrity ... 
were never fully realized for law enforcement officers [,]" see Byron L. Warnken, 
The Law Enforcement Officers' Privilege Against Compelled Self-Incriminaion,\6 
U. BALT. L. REV. 452,475 (1987). For a more recent critique and analysis of 
Garrity and its progeny, see Peter Westen, Answer Self-Incriminating Questions or 
Be Fired, 37 AM. J. CRIM. L. 97 (2010). 
44
 Garrity, 385 U.S. at 497-98 n.5 (quoting Norman Lamm, The 5th Amendment and 
Its Equivalent in Jewish Law, DECALOGUE J., 1, Jan.-Feb. 1967, at 1). 
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The footnote opens with Rabbi L a m m ' s threshold observation 
distinguishing between the outright ban on criminal confessions in the 
Jewish legal system and the admissibility of voluntary confessions in 
American law.4 5 Next, the footnote moves to Rabbi L a m m ' s 
explanation for this distinction, emphasizing the concern voiced by 
Maimonides and others for the psychological forces that, at times, 
compel a suspect to offer a false confession. As a result, Rabbi Lamm 
explains, Jewish law mandates an outright ban on all criminal 
confessions.46 Moreover, the footnote quotes Rabbi L a m m ' s 
qualification that, in contrast, because the Consti tution's concern is 
limited to forced confessions, American law need not preclude all 
criminal confessions from evidence. 7 
45
 Id. at 497 n.5 (quoting Lamm, supra note 44, at 10): 
It should be pointed out, at the very outset, that the Halakhah does 
not distinguish between voluntary and forced confessions . . . . 
And it is here that one of the basic differences between 
Constitutional and Talmudic Law arises. According to the 
Constitution, a man cannot be compelled to testify against himself. 
. . . The Halakhah . . . does not permit self-incriminating 
testimony. It is inadmissible, even if voluntarily offered. 
Confession . . . is simply not an instrument of the Law. The issue 
[in Jewish law], then, is not compulsion, but the whole idea of 
legal confession. 
46
 Id. at 497 n.5 (quoting Lamm, supra note 44, at 12): 
The Halakhah . . . is . . . concerned with protecting the confessant 
from his own aberrations which manifest themselves, either as 
completely fabricated confessions, or as exaggerations of the real 
facts... . While certainly not all, or even most criminal 
confessions are directly attributable, in whole or in part, to the 
Death Instinct, the Halakhah is sufficiently concerned with the 
minority of instances, where such is the case, to disqualify all 
criminal confessions and to discard confession as a legal 
instrument. 
47
 Id. at 497 n.5 (quoting Lamm, supra note 44, at 12): 
[T]he Constitutional ruling on self-incrimination concerns only 
forced confessions, and its restricted character is a result of its 
historical evolution as a civilized protest against the use of torture 
in extorting confessions. The Halakhic ruling, however, is much 
broader and discards confessions in toto, and this because of its 
psychological insight and its concern for saving man from his own 
83 
Whatever the merits of the holding in Garrity, the Cour t ' s 
reliance on Jewish law is both clear and effective. Unlike the 
sweeping scope and ambition of the opinion' in Miranda, the Cour t ' s 
ruling in Garrity did not address broad questions regarding the origins 
and contours of the constitutional protection against self-incrimination. 
Instead, the Garrity opinion was limited to the specific issue of the 
manner of coercion that renders a confession inadmissible. In this 
context, the psychological insights from Jewish law provide a valuable 
theoretical foundation for the recognition that coercion takes various 
forms—including, as the Court put it, not only "coarse and vulgar 
ones" but "subtle pressures" as well .4 9 More generally, comparing 
favorably with the substantive and largely mechanical approach in 
Miranda, the conceptual approach in Garrity presents a helpful 
framework for the application of Jewish law to issues in American 
law.50 In particular, the references to Jewish legal theory in Garrity 
destructive inclinations. 
48
 See supra note 43. 
49
 Id. at 496. 
50
 Although other American cases have also cited Jewish law in the context of 
criminal confessions, see supra note 5, the 1991 case of Moses v. Allard, decided by 
Chief Judge Gerald Rosen of the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Michigan, likely includes the most extensive discussion of Jewish law on the issue 
of self-incrimination. See Moses v. Allard, 779 F. Supp. 857, 870 (E.D. Mich. 
1991). Notably, similar to the conceptual framework applied in Garrity, Judge 
Rosen's approach incorporates a close look at the substance of the rule in Jewish law 
and its conceptual underpinnings, as well as the historical record. 
A Hard involved the question of whether the Fifth Amendment protects a 
witness against being compelled to testify in an American court in a civil case, when 
the compelled testimony could be used in a foreign criminal prosecution against the 
witness. See id. Judge Rosen's opinion describes the case as: 
one of those relatively rare instances injudicial decision-making in 
which precedent provides no compelling answers in one direction 
or the other, but rather requires inquiry into, and analysis of, the 
philosophy and policy that underlies and supports one of this 
nation's most widely accepted and fundamental constitutional 
rights. Indeed, because there do not appear to be any definitive 
precedential beacon lights to clearly illuminate a decisional path, it 
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helped the Court reframe and reconceptualize the issue of coercion in 
the American law of criminal confessions, to arrive at a more nuanced, 
more effective, and more satisfying understanding, interpretation, and 
determination of the constitutional requirement of voluntariness. 
III. The Framework Applied: The Missed Opportunity of 
Colorado v. Connelly 
The conceptual framework applied in Garrity, which added 
depth and meaning to the United States Supreme Cour t ' s 
understanding of coercion, carries the potential for a wide-ranging 
rethinking of the concept of voluntariness in criminal confessions. 
The Cour t ' s analysis in Garrity acknowledged that the Constitution 
protects against both obvious and more subtle forms of pressure, such 
as the threat of dismissal from employment. Taking this principle a 
seems to the Court that the inquiry must begin in the first instance 
with the history and underlying tenets of the privilege. 
Id. 
The opinion then offers a historical review of the privilege, beginning with 
a careful description of Jewish law in this area, stating that the rule against self-
incrimination "was an absolute and could not be waived or relinquished." Id. Next, 
the opinion observes that "the theological and jurisprudential underpinnings for this 
rule are somewhat unclear." Id. Alluding to the explanations of Maimonides, 
Radbaz, and Rabbi Lamm, Judge Rosen notes that: 
It may have been that a self-accusatory statement was considered 
untrustworthy or that a person who would incriminate himself was 
not considered of sound mind, and, thus, could not form the intent 
to incriminate himself. Or, it may have been that self-incrimination 
in a criminal matter was likened to attempted suicide, a practice 
prohibited under Jewish law on the theory that the individual's 
body belongs to God and not to the individual. 
Id. 
Finally, the opinion emphasizes that "some commentators contend that the 
nexus between the ancient Jewish law and the modern privilege is tenuous at best" 
and that "[t]he connection to medieval English law ... is less than clear." Id. 
51
 479 U.S. 157 (1986). I thank Steve Winter for suggesting the conceptual 
relevance of Jewish legal theory to the issues of voluntariness and coercion in 
Connelly. 
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step further in other cases, courts might apply the psychological 
insights from Rabbi L a m m ' s article to recognize forms of internal and 
psychological coercion that should likewise-render inadmissible any 
resulting statements. However , when these issues were brought before 
the Supreme Court in the 1986 case of Colorado v. Connelly,52 the 
Cour t ' s holding largely ignored the reality and significance of internal 
psychological coercion, resulting in a missed opportunity to advance 
and develop the Court ' s jurisprudence in this area.53 
In Connelly, the Court considered the admissibility of the 
confession of a criminal suspect w h o was later diagnosed as having 
suffered from chronic schizophrenia and having been in "a psychotic 
state" at the time of his confession.54 Among other findings, a 
psychiatrist testified that the suspect had been hearing the "voice of 
G o d " and was "[r]eluctantly following the command of voices" when 
he decided to confess to the crimes.55 The psychiatrist concluded that 
the suspect was suffering from "command hallucination" that affected 
his "volitional abilities; that is, his ability to make free and rational 
choices," and that his confession was the result of "psychosis."5 6 
Based on this testimony, the Colorado trial court suppressed 
the suspect 's confessions on the grounds that they were "involuntary" 
and not the product of the suspect 's "free will ."5 7 The Colorado 
Supreme Court affirmed, likewise holding that a statement is 
admissible only if it is "the product of a rational intellect and a free 
will."5 8 The court emphasized that "the absence of police coercion or 
52
 Id. 
53
 For a discussion that acknowledges the inconsistency between Gafrity and 
Connelly, while favoring the approach in Connelly, see Clymer, supra note 43, at 
1342-47. 
54
 Connelly, 479 U.S. at 161. 
55
 Id. 
56Id.atl62. 
51
 Id. 
5SId. (quoting People v. Connelly, 702 P.2d 722, 728 (Colo. 1985)). 
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duress does not foreclose a finding of involuntariness. One's capacity 
for rational judgment and free choice may be overborne as much by 
certain forms of severe mental illness as b y external pressure."5 9 
Although the Colorado Supreme Court did not cite either Garrity or 
Jewish legal theory, the court's approach was consistent with Rabbi 
Lamm's explanation of Jewish law. The court acknowledged that, 
notwithstanding the absence of external coercion, a criminal 
confession that is the product of internal psychological coercion 
should be deemed involuntary and inadmissible as evidence.6 0 Thus, 
when the case was brought before the United States Supreme Court, it 
presented an opportunity for the Court to adopt a similar approach, 
precluding the use of criminal confessions that are the result of 
internal psychological coercion. 
Instead, the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding 
that the constitutional protections against involuntary confessions are 
triggered only in instances of "police conduct causally related to the 
confessions.. ."61 To be sure, the Court conceded that "as interrogators 
have turned to more subtle forms of psychological persuasion, courts 
have found the mental condition of the defendant a more significant 
factor in the 'voluntariness ' calculus." However , the Court insisted 
that "this fact does not justify a conclusion that a defendant's mental 
condition, by itself and apart from its relation to official coercion, 
should ever dispose of the inquiry into constitutional 
'voluntar iness . '" Thus, rather than applying psychological insights 
that allow for a more nuanced understanding of the importance of 
protecting criminal defendants from their own involuntary 
confessions, the Court simply concluded that, in the absence of 
government coercion, the Constitution does not protect against 
involuntary confessions. 
59
 Id. (quoting People v. Connelly, 702 P.2d 722, 728 (Colo. 1985)). 
60
 Id. at 162-63. 
61
 Id. at 164. ' " 
62
 Id. 
63
 Id. 
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The majority opinion in Connelly prompted a number of 
concurring and dissenting opinions, including a strong dissent written 
by Justice Brennan and jo ined by Justice Marshall .6 4 Justice 
Brennan 's dissent takes issue with both the majori ty 's analysis of 
earlier cases and, more importantly, rejects the premise that the 
Constitution guards against involuntary confessions only when they 
are the result of police coercion: 
The absence of police wrongdoing should not, 
by itself, determine the voluntariness of a confession by 
a mentally ill person. The requirement that a 
confession be voluntary reflects a recognition of the 
importance of free will and of reliability in determining 
the admissibility of a confession, and thus demands an 
inquiry into the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the confession.65 
As Justice Brennan powerfully argued: 
Today's decision restricts the application of the 
term "involuntary" to those confessions obtained by 
police coercion. Confessions by mentally ill individuals 
or b y persons coerced b y parties other than police 
64 See id. at 174 (Brennan, J. dissenting). In addition, Connelly quickly prompted 
extensive scholarly criticism. See, e.g., Laurence A. Benner, Requiem for Miranda: 
The Rehnquist Court's Voluntariness Doctrine in Historical Perspective, 67 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 59 (1989); George E. Dix, Federal Constitutional Confession Law: The 1986 
and 1987 Supreme Court Terms, 67 TEX. L. REV. 231(1988); Noel Moran, 
Confessions Compelled by Mental Illness: What's an Insane Person To Do? 
Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S Ct. 515 (1986), 56 U. CiN. L. REV. 1049 (1988); Scott 
A. McCreight, Comment, Colorado v. Connelly: Due Process Challenges to 
Confessions and Evidentiary Reliability Interests, 73 IOWAL. REV. 207 (1987). 
More recently, one scholar declared that, in Connelly the Court "turn[ed] 200 years 
of confession law on its head." Mark A. Godsey, Reliability Lost, False Confessions 
Discovered, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 623, 627 (2007). See also Claudio Salas, Note, The 
Case for Excluding the Criminal Confessions of the Mentally III, 16 YALE J.L. & 
HUMAN. 243 (2004). 
65
 Connelly, 479 U.S. at 176. 
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officers are now considered "voluntary." The Court's 
failure to recognize all forms of involuntariness or 
coercion as antithetical to due process reflects a refusal 
to acknowledge free will as a value of constitutional 
consequence. But due process derives much of its 
meaning from a conception of fundamental fairness that 
emphasizes the right to make vital choices voluntarily. . 
. . This right requires vigilant protection if we are to 
safeguard the values of private conscience and human 
dignity.66 
Like the decisions of the Colorado State Courts, Justice 
Brennan ' s opinion calls for a more thoughtful appreciation of the 
doctrine of voluntariness. Justice Brennan emphasized the need "to 
recognize all forms of involuntariness or coercion"6 7 as inconsistent 
with constitutional protections against self-incrimination. As Rabbi 
Lamm observed 30 years before Connelly, and as Maimonides 
explained more than 700 years earlier, internal forms of psychological 
coercion can be as real and compelling as external coercion. As 
Justice Brennan declared, admitting confessions that are the result of 
internal psychological forces violates the values of due process and 
fundamental fairness. The majori ty 's failure to adopt a similar 
approach represents a missed opportunity to develop the doctrine 
underlying an important constitutional protection. More generally, the 
Court missed an opportunity to apply a conceptual framework from 
Jewish law in a way that strengthens and adds meaning to an area of 
the American legal system. 
Conclusion 
In recent years, scholars have documented and explored the 
ongoing problem of false confessions - in the American criminal justice 
system. In the words of Brandon Garrett, the author of an important 
66
 Id. 
67Id. 
See, e.g., Drizin & Leo, supra note 13; Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False 
Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1051(2010); Saul M. Kassin, et. al., Police-Induced 
Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3 
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recent study on the phenomenon of false confessions: "There is a new 
awareness among scholars, legislators, courts, prosecutors, police 
departments, and the public that innocent people falsely confess . . . . " 
69
 Yet, as Garrett further observes: "False confessions present a 
puzzle: How could innocent people convincingly confess to crimes 
they knew nothing about?"70 Or, as Peter Brooks has put it: " H o w can 
someone make a false confession?"71 
Various responses have been offered to these questions. 
Significantly, a number of these responses have incorporated insights 
into human psychology similar to those found in Jewish legal sources 
dating back to Maimonides. For example, Garrett notes the forms of 
psychological coercion that are applied in police interrogations: 
"Scholars increasingly study the psychological techniques that can 
cause people to falsely confess and have documented how such 
techniques were used in instances of known false confessions . . . ."72 
Brooks goes a step further, drawing expressly on Jewish law.7 3 
Relying in part on the insights that Maimonides and Rabbi L a m m 
derive from the Talmudic ban on self-incrimination, Brooks provides a 
complex and nuanced understanding of psychological factors that may 
contribute to the decision to confess falsely: 
Precisely because the false referentiality of confession 
may be secondary to the need to confess, a need 
produced by the coercion of interrogation or the subtler 
coercion of the need to stage a scene of exposure as the 
only propitiation of accusation, including self-
accusation for being in a scene of exposure. Or, as 
Talmudic law has recognized for millennia, confession 
may be the product of the death-drive, the production of 
(2010). 
69
 Garrett, supra note 68, at 1052-53. 
10
 Id. at 1052. 
71
 BROOKS, supra note 2, at 21. 
72
 Garrett, supra note 68, at 1053. 
73
 BROOKS, supra note 2, at 21. 
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incriminating acts to assure punishment or even self-
annihilation, and hence inherently suspect because it is 
in contradiction to the basic human instinct of self-
preservation. Or, as Freud would have it, unconscious 
guilt may produce crime in order to assure punishment 
as the only satisfaction of the guilt.74 
The United States Supreme Court has l ikewise recognized the 
potential relevance of Jewish legal theory in considering the American 
law of self-incrimination, referencing Jewish law in both Miranda v. 
Arizona 75 and Garrity v. New Jersey?6 In fact, in Garrity, the Court 
relied directly on insights from Jewish legal sources to support its 
careful analysis of forms of subtle psychological coercion in the 
American legal system.77 However , when faced with the opportunity 
to develop a more nuanced jurisprudence of voluntariness and 
coercion in criminal confessions, the Court failed to acknowledge the 
extent to which both external and internal forces might impact an 
admission of guilt. In light of the ongoing problem of false 
confessions, the Court should rethink the current law of self-
incrimination, including the decision in Colorado v. Connelly.™ To 
74
 Id. Cf Salas, supra note 64, at 266 n. 136-137 (quoting RAYMOND DEPAULO, JR., 
& KEITH RUSSEL ABLOW, HOW TO COPE WITH DEPRESSION 16 (1989) ( " A depressed 
person puts herself down by making comments such as 'I'm such a failure; I wonder 
how you stay with m e . ' . . . A depressed person may also accept blame for problems 
that do not exist or are clearly not his or her fault."). 
75
 384 U.S. 436, 458 n.27 (1966). 
76
 385 U.S. 493,497-98 n.5 (1967). 
77
 Id. at 497-98 &n.5 
78 479 U.S. 157 (1986). Cf. Godsey, supra note 64: 
It may take years for social scientists and psychiatrists to fully 
understand why and How often false confessions occur. For now, 
however, we know that false confessions are a problem, we know 
that many innocent people have been convicted as a result of false 
confessions, and we know that, because of Colorado v. Connelly, 
courts have no constitutional grounds on which to deal with this 
problem. 
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that end, it may be appropriate for the Court to look once again to the 
insights provided by Jewish law and legal theory. 
Id. at 629. 
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